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Are the benefits of disinflation worth the costs? 
-Croushore  (1992) 
2.1  Price Stability: Too Much of a Good Thing? 
The notion that price stability should be the priority target of  monetary pol- 
icy has nowadays become widely accepted. This is due to the perception that 
high and volatile inflation rates distort economic allocation and reduce long- 
term growth potential (Barro 1995), whereas lasting monetary stability is con- 
ducive to economic growth, social welfare, and social cohesion alike. By con- 
trast, the consensus regarding assessment of  the “excess burden” associated 
with a moderate inflation rate, and of the cost (the “sacrifice ratio”) of correct- 
ing such a rate, is much more fragile.’ In other words, are the benefits of price 
stability and the costs of  disinflation still in reasonable proportion to one an- 
other, or should a moderate pace of inflation-rather  than undue zeal in fight- 
ing inflation-be  tolerated or even aimed at by economic policymakers?2 
In the context of an in-depth analysis of the functions of money, Konieczny 
Karl-Heinz Todter is deputy head of the Division of Econometrics in the Department of Eco- 
nomics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Gerhard Ziebarth is head of the Division of Business Cycle 
Analysis and National Accounts in the Department of Economics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The opinions expressed in this paper are not necessarily consistent with the official position of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. The authors thank the participants of an NBER workshop; S. P. Chakra- 
varty, University of Bangor; F.  Seitz, Fachhochschule Amberg-Weiden; and colleagues in the Eco- 
nomics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank, especially G. Coenen, H. Hansen, P.  Heinelt, 
and P. Limmel, for their valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are the authors’. 
1. In this connection, it should not be entirely overlooked that the costs of a disinflation could 
at bottom be charged to the preceding inflation and would have to be offset against its gains. 
2. Stanley Fischer, for instance, argues: “The evidence points to an inflation range of  1-3%  as 
being optimal. . . . Once lower inflation is attained, the challenge for policy is to preserve those 
gains” (1994a, 40). Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry argue along similar lines: “Comparing low infla- 
tion rates with a zero inflation rate, we are convinced that the unemployment costs outweigh the 
costs of tax distortions. We fully appreciate the benefits of stabilizing inflation at a low rate, and 
advocate that as an appropriate target for monetary policy. But the optimal inflation target is not 
zero” (1996,52). 
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comes to the following conclusion regarding the optimality of an inflation rate 
of  zero: “The review of the theoretical arguments leads me to conclude that 
the optimal rate of inflation is zero” (1994, 34). He emphasizes especially the 
adverse effects of inflation on the role of money as a unit of account: 
The uniqueness of  zero arises from the accounting role of  money: it is, 
simply, infinitely easier to divide by  one than by  any other number. Only 
when the price level is stable can money perform properly its role as a stable 
unit of account and standard of value. The desirability of a stable standard 
of  measurement is evident from  other arrangements: without exception, 
societies have chosen all other units of  measure to be of  constant value. 
Uniquely among all numbers, the credibility of zero can be defended on the 
grounds that “it makes a pound (&)just  like a pound (lb).” (32) 
What is to be understood by “price stability” has been expressed in different 
ways. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United 
States, defines stable prices as “price levels sufficiently stable so that expecta- 
tions of  [price level] change do not become major factors in key economic 
decisions” (1989). Decisions with a very short time horizon would probably 
turn out no different with an inflation rate of  2 to 3 percent from what they 
would be with price stability. On the other hand, decisions involving a long- 
term commitment or a long planning horizon must indeed take due account of 
the effects even of moderate inflation rates, and an average inflation rate of 
zero will actually impinge on decision making if that rate is accompanied by 
high volatility. It also has to be borne in mind that the threshold for the percep- 
tion of inflationary processes depends on past experience and therefore may 
differ from country to country. 
Anyway, inflation rates have been declining all over the world for a number 
of years. As measured by  the consumer price index, the inflation rate in the 
G-7 countries averaged 3.9 percent per annum between 1960 and 1973. In the 
wake of oil price hikes and an accommodating monetary policy on the part of 
some central banks, it rose to 9.7 percent per annum between 1973 and 1979. 
During the eighties the average inflation rate still came to 5.5 percent per an- 
num. But by  1995 the inflation rate of  the G-7 countries was averaging 2.5 
percent, and of  the 27 OECD nations, 18 registered an inflation rate of less 
than 3 percent in 1995. Besides the globally higher sensitivity to inflation as a 
result of the globalization of the financial markets (Issing 1996a), in the mem- 
ber states of the European Union this trend probably also owes something to 
the envisaged monetary union. 
Against this background, and in the light of the forthcoming debate on the 
operative objectives of monetary policy in the context of a monetary union in 
Europe, the important economic policy question arises for many countries: Do 
the benejits of price stability warrant the costs of  anyfurther disinflation? In a 
comprehensive study for the United States, Feldstein put this question into 
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(i.e., the measured rate of inflation minus 2 percentage points) has stabilized 
at 2%, is the gain from reducing inflation to zero worth the sacrifice in output 
and employment that would be required to achieve it?”3 
Even though our experience of inflation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
is different from that in the United States and the institutional framework here 
shows specific features, monetary policy in this country has to face the same 
issue. The purpose of  this paper is therefore to provide an empirically sup- 
ported answer for Germany to the question raised by  Feldstein. Against the 
background of the monetary policy strategy pursued by  the Bundesbank, we 
first consider, in section 2.2, the costs of disinjution; in quantifying the sacri- 
fice ratio we draw on recently published empirical investigations. With regard 
to the benefits of price stability, there have hitherto been no analyses for Ger- 
many as detailed as that by Feldstein for the United States. The focal point of 
this paper is therefore section 2.3, in which, building on the methodological 
foundation of Feldstein’s approach, we examine the implications for macroeco- 
nomic welfare of the interaction of even moderate rates of inflation with the 
distorting effects of the tax system:  First of all, we address, as part of an inter- 
temporal approach, the impact of inflation on the allocation of consumption 
and saving. Then we investigate the implications of  inflation for demand for 
owner-occupied housing. Thereafter, we consider the distorting effects of in- 
flation on money demand, which ever since Bailey’s (1956) paper have been 
at the center of  the literature on the welfare effects of  inflation. Finally, we 
contemplate the effects of inflation on public revenue from the money creation 
process (seigniorage) and on government debt service. Section 2.4 offers a 
summary and some concluding remarks. 
Economists should be circumspect when attempting to estimate the costs of 
reducing the inflation rate. 
-Lucas  (1990) 
2.2  On the Costs of Disinflation 
The costs of a lasting reduction in the rate of inflation depend on nominal 
and real rigidities in the overall goods and labor markets. Other significant 
factors are the stance of fiscal policy, the monetary policy strategy pursued by 
the central bank, and the degree of stability already reached. The Bundesbank‘s 
monetary policy has been based on a monetary targeting strategy for over 20 
years. With the aid of this policy stance, it has proved possible (despite oil price 
hikes, monetary upheavals, and tensions in the wake of German unification) to 
3. Feldstein (1997, 123-24). In the following we refer to this paper without any further details. 
4. The fact that, for various reasons, the underlying tax systems play a particular part in the 
assessment of inflation effects has been stressed in a number of papers; see, e.g., Feldstein, Green, 
and Sheshinski (1978), Tanzi (1980), King and Fullerton (1983), Sinn (1987). and Sievert et al. 
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limit the average rate of inflation in those two decades to about 3 percent per 
annum, and thus well below the average level of the other industrial countries 
(5.5 percent). 
2.2.1  Monetary Growth and Inflation 
Partly owing to deregulation of the financial markets and to financial innova- 
tions, a number of countries have dispensed with the traditional monetary ag- 
gregates as indicators and intermediate targets of  monetary policy. Even so, 
there continues to be a broad consensus that over the long term, inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon'  Pursuant to the quantity equation, the product of the 
money stock (M)  and the velocity of circulation (V)  equals the product of the 
price level (P)  and the real gross domestic product (Y).  Written logarithmically, 
the following applies? 
(1)  m+  v  =  p+  y. 
On the basis of  this quaniity equation, Hallman, Porter, and Small (1989) 
define the equilibrium price level (P*) as the money stock per unit of  real 
production potential (Y*)  at the equilibrium velocity of circulation (V*): 
(2)  p*  =  m +  v* - y*. 
If a stable long-term money demand function 
(3) 
exists,'  with p,  being either constant or a function of stationary variables and 
the random variable E, with expectation zero, measuring deviations from long- 
term money demand, then the equilibrium velocity of circulation can be ex- 
pressed as8 
rn-  p  =  Po+  py+ & 
(4)  y*  = -  Po  + (1 - P)Y*. 
The equilibrium price level can now be written 
5.  In the shorter to medium term, trends in the general price level may certainly depart from the 
path marked out by the growth of the money stock. Nonmonetary price stimuli, temporary changes 
in the velocity of  circulation of  money, or cyclical fluctuations in real income may  be super- 
imposed on the key relationships for a considerable period. But this does not alter the basic fact 
that a process of sustained erosion of  the purchasing power of money is a monetary phenomenon, 
for which economic policy is accountable. 
6. In this subsection, lowercase letters denote logarithms of variables and the symbol A stands 
for differences, i.e., x = In X and Ax =  x -  x_!. 
7. For Germany it can be assumed that even after unification, there is a stable long-term money 
demand function;  see Issing and Todter (1995), Scharnagl (1996a,  1996b), and the references 
therein. 
8. Issing and Todter (1995) estimate the income elasticity of money demand (p) in Germany at 
1.43. Given a growth rate of real production potential averaging 2.2 percent per annum, this im- 
plies a trend decline in the velocity of circulation of just under 1 percent per annum. 51  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
Table 2.1  Monetary Growth and Inflation in Germany (average growth rates of 
M3, in percent per annum) 
Period  Am3  AY  *  Ap*"  AP 
1970:  1-79:4  10.4  3.2  5.8  5.5 
1980  1-89:4  6.1  2.1  3.1  2.8 
1990:  1-96:2b  7.6  3.6  2.5  2.5 
Source; Issing and Todter (1995) and authors' calculations. 
"Ap* = Am3 -  1.43 Ay*. 
bIncluding  the increase in M3 and in potential production due to unification. 
p*  =  m - Po - PY* 
As table 2.1 shows, the growth rates of  equilibrium prices over fairly long 
periods agree pretty well with the actual inflation rates. The price gap, that is, 
the difference between the equilibrium price level and the actual price level, 
is composed of two components, viz., the degree of utilization of production 
potential (output gap) and the degree of liquidity (velocity gap): 
(6)  p* - p  = (y - y*) + (v* - v) =  P(y - y*) +  E. 
In other words, pressure on prices is felt whenever production capacities are 
being heavily utilized or whenever cash holding is higher than is consistent 
with long-term money demand. 
As empirical investigations for Germany show, the equilibrium price level 
and the actual price level  are cointegrated (see Todter and Reimers  1994; 
Scharnagl 1996a). It follows from this that differences between the two vari- 
ables are of a temporary nature and that disequilibria that have arisen will dis- 
appear again over time. The course of price movements can then be described 
(as is done here in stylized form) by an error correction equation: 
(7)  Ap =  Ape +  X(p* - p) =  Ape +  hP(y - y*)  +  XE. 
The smaller the parameter X,  the more sluggishly prices respond to (goods 
and money market) disequilibria, and the higher real rigidity is. The expected 
inflation rate may be specified in this connection as a learning process in which 
inflation expectations adjust to changes in equilibrium prices, 
(8)  Ape =  YAP-, + (1 - Y)AP*, 
where the parameter y is a measure of nominal rigidity. 
2.2.2  The Bundesbank's Monetary Targeting Strategy 
The Bundesbank's monetary targeting strategy primarily serves the objective 
of price stability. This strategy is geared to the long-term relationship between 
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and supported empiri~ally.~  Since 1988 the Bundesbank has used the money 
stock in the definition M3 as the indicator and intermediate target of its mone- 
tary policy.lo  The annual target for the growth rate of the money stock (p,) is 
derived in accordance with a normative figure for the rate of inflation aimed at 
over the medium term (T), after taking due account of forecasts of the growth 
of production potential (Ay*)  and of the trend change in the velocity of circula- 
tion (Av"): 
(9)  p,  =  T  +  Ay* - Av*  =  T  +  PAY*. 
If  the Bundesbank succeeds in getting the money stock to grow in line with 
this target (Am = p,), then the equilibrium price level and-after  the expiration 
of dynamic adjustment reactions-the  actual price level increase at the rate 
Ap* = Ap = T. 
If the Bundesbank wanted to reduce the target inflation rate from T  to zero, 
it would durably have  to lower the growth rate of  the money stock to  p, = 
P Ay*. In the event of uncertainty about the level of inflation, however, a dis- 
tinction must be made between an inflation target and a price level target. To 
illustrate the difference between the two targets, let it be assumed that the cen- 
tral bank manages to attain the inflation target of zero, except for an identically 
and independently distributed random variable v,  with expectation zero and 
variance u:.  The price level (p,  = pr-l  + v,)  then follows a random walk pro- 
cess with variance uiT after T periods. Even though the expected inflation rate 
for the next period is zero, the uncertainty about the price level in the more 
distant future may be very high. If, by  contrast, the central bank is pursuing 
the target of stability of price level, the variance of the price level is ui, regard- 
less of the time horizon. The difference between the two strategies resides in 
the fact that in the case of an inflation target, the central bank does not need to 
respond to a temporary positive price shock, whereas in the case of a price- 
level target, it is forced to usher in a period of deflation (see also Scarth 1994; 
Fischer 1994a; Hagen and Neumann 1996). 
2.2.3  Evidence on the Sacrifice Ratio 
The potential costs of disinflation consist in output and employment losses 
during the period of  running down inflation. The level of  the costs depends 
on the slope of the Phillips curve (or the slope of the macroeconomic supply 
function). If the long-term Phillips curve has negative slope, any reduction in 
inflation results in lasting losses of  output and employment; if  the curve is 
vertical, the output and employment losses are temporary. 
9. On the theoretical and empirical foundations of monetary policy, see Issing (1992); on past 
experience of the monetary targeting strategy, see Issing (1995) and Konig (1996). 
10. M3 is currency  in circulation  and sight deposits, time deposits for  less than four years, 
and savings deposits at three months'  notice held by  domestic nonbanks-other  than the federal 
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In the above P* model, just as in neoclassical models, there need not be any 
disinflation costs at all if the central bank announces the target of disinflation 
credibly and if expectations respond immediately. Monetarist and neoclassical 
models exhibit a vertical Phillips curve in the long run, and thus temporary 
disinflation costs. The Keynesian models of  the sixties postulated a lasting 
negative trade-off. According to neo-Keynesian theory, too, changes in mone- 
tary policy exert effects in real terms on account of rigidities in wage and price 
movements.” The idea of a permanent trade-off between inflation and unem- 
ployment is, however, nowadays rejected by most economists: “There is a gen- 
eral acceptance among economists that the medium, and longer, term Phillips 
curve is vertical. Hence, there is no trade-off in the longer run between growth 
and inflation. Consequently, there is now also a consensus that the primary 
macro-policy objective of a central bank should be price stability.”12 
In the literature, it is customary to express the costs of disinflation in terms 
of what is known as the “sacrifice ratio.” The “output sacrifice ratio” (u)  mea- 
sures the cumulative output loss associated with a decline in the inflation rate. 
The “unemployment sacrifice ratio” (a,)  denotes the corresponding rise in the 
unemployment rate. A link between the two concepts can be effected by  the 
“Okun gap.” The simplest way of determining sacrifice ratios is to measure for 
concrete historical periods of disinflation the cumulative output loss in relation 
to its trend movement or to the cumulative change in the unemployment rate. 
By this method, Schelde-Andersen (1992) computes sacrifice ratios for  16 
OECD countries. He selects the time span from 1979 to 1982 as a common 
period of  disinflation in all countries. For Germany, the ratio relative to the 
unemployment rate works out at u, = 6.4, whereas the indicator measured in 
terms of output yields the value a = 2.2.13 Ball (1994) uses a similar method 
but identifies specific disinflation periods for each country. For Germany he 
obtains a ratio of  u = 3.6 on the basis of  quarterly figures for the period 
1980:1-86:3.14 In a similar way to Ball, but with a different approach to esti- 
mating production potential, Herrmann (1996) computes a value of  roughly 
u = 2.6 on the basis of  quarterly data for the period 1981:4-86:4,  whereas 
11. In simulations with small empirical models for the United States, Croushore comes to the 
conclusion: “In a comparison of disinflation costs across the different models, the Monetarist-type 
model shows the lowest cost (actually a negative cost), the New-Classical-type model shows zero 
cost, the Keynesian-type model shows a high cost, and the PSTAR+  model shows a cost in be- 
tween the high and low costs of the other models” (1992, 13). 
12. Goodhart (1992, 332). Taylor argues along similar lines: “But if there is any change in the 
paradigm of macro-economics that most economists would agree with, it is that the trade-off view 
was mistaken” (1992, 13). On the other hand, Akerlof et al. argue that lasting real costs of disinfla- 
tion exist on account of a “deeply rooted downward nominal wage rigidity” in the economy: “The 
unemployment costs are not one-time but, rather, permanent and substantial” (1996,52). 
13. For the longer periods from  1979 to 1985 or 1988, the values for u  were actually lower, 
1.2 and 1.6, respectively. This suggests that the costs of disinflation are temporary and decrease 
over time. 
14. With annual data for the period 1980-86  he arrived at the value 2.1. 54  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
the ratio for the most recent period of  disinflation 1992:l-95:4  works out at 
u = 2.2. 
More analytically oriented approaches to the estimation of the costs of disin- 
flation are mostly based on Phillips-type relations for wage or price inflation. 
In the context of the P* model (eqs. [7] and [8]) the output sacrifice ratio can 
be measured as the relation between the coefficients of nominal and real rigid- 
ity (see Schelde-Andersen 1992, 112): 
(10)  u =  yIAp. 
In this model, a decline in monetary growth by  1 percentage point leads 
directly to an equally large decrease in the growth rate of equilibrium prices 
and ultimately also of  the actual inflation rate. The expected inflation rate, 
however, initially declines by only 1 -  y,  in line with equation (8). Hence, a 
gap of y percent between the actual decrease in the inflation rate and the ex- 
pected decrease comes into being on account of nominal rigidities. In order to 
close this gap, the degree of capacity utilization must drop by ylAp percentage 
points. In the long run, that is, after expectations have come into line with the 
reduced monetary growth, output and the unemployment rate revert to their 
equilibrium values. 
On the basis of price equations similar to equation (7), Schelde-Andersen 
(1992) estimates the value of u  = 3.3 for the output sacrifice ratio for Germany. 
A Phillips relationship for the wage inflation rate yields uu  = 4.4 for the unem- 
ployment sacrifice ratio. These estimates also take account of the possibility of 
permanent disinflation costs, which might derive from the presence of hystere- 
sis effects on the labor market.I5 
It is conspicuous that in these studies the costs of disinflation as estimated 
for Germany lie distinctly above the OECD average (see table 2.2). In a com- 
parison by Schelde-Andersen (1992) on the basis of the sacrifice ratios he esti- 
mated for 16 OECD countries, Germany comes last, as the country with the 
highest disinflation costs. One possible “explanation” might be that disinfla- 
tion costs appear to be higher, the lower the initial inflation rate: “A high initial 
rate of inflation seems to reduce the sacrifice ratio, thus suggesting that infla- 
tion is more costly to reduce when it is already very low.”  l6 
As the above remarks have illustrated, empirical estimates of sacrifice ratios 
involve a high  degree of  uncertainty. The results depend crucially on  the 
method, the frequency of the data used, and a number of other factors. This is 
why simulations with a macroeconometric structural model form an alternative 
15. Schelde-Andersen (1992, 159) rejects the hypothesis of extreme hysteresis on the basis of 
estimates of the Phillips relationship for all countries except the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, the null hypothesis that the unemployment rate follows a random walk process cannot be 
rejected for any of the 16 countries under review. 
16. Schelde-Andersen (1992, 129). Other reasons for high disinflation costs relevant for Ger- 
many may have been a high real exchange rate (is., an  unfavorable international competitive posi- 
tion) and low flexibility of the wage-bargaining process. 55  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
Table 2.2  Estimates of the Sacrifice Ratio for Germany 
Method and Author 
Sacrifice Ratio 
Unemployment  output 
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to such partial analytical estimates.” Using the Bundesbank’s multicounty 
econometric model Jahnke (1998) simulated a permanent increase in short- 
term interest rates that leads to a permanent decline in the inflation rate.’*  The 
estimation period for the forecasts of  behavioral equations in the model ex- 
tends from 1975:l to 1995:4, and the simulation period covers the time span 
from 1997:  1 to 2004:4. Over that span of eight years the sacrifice ratio, mea- 
sured in terms of  output, works out at about u = 4; this value is above the 
estimates obtained by partial analytical approaches (see table 2.2). 
Altogether, the available empirical evidence suggests that in the past the 
output sacrifice ratio for Germany can hardly have been above u = 4.19 At that 
level it would have been about two to three times as high as the average of 
the other OECD countries. The empirical estimates suggest that the costs of 
disinflation (C)  do not simply depend linearly on the disinflation rate but rather 
rise disproportionally fast: 
(11)  c =  (TTI+’p,  cp  > 0. 
According to this equation, a reduction of  the inflation rate by  1 percentage 
point-regardless  of cp-would  imply an output loss amounting to 4 percent 
17. Schelde-Andersen argues in favor of the model simulation approach “Analytically, this is 
by far the most satisfactory method as it is comprehensive and exogenous factors are isolated. The 
sensitivity of costs to changes in the lag structure of the price and wage formation process can be 
estimated and it is also possible to illustrate the effect of changes in credibility” (1992, 122). 
18. Documentation  for the Bundesbank model is included in Deutscbe Bundesbank (1994a, 
1996~). 
19. Feldstein uses an output sacrifice ratio for the United States of 2 to 3 in his calculations. 56  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
of GDP. Assuming cp  = 0.5, a reduction of  the inflation rate by  2 percentage 
points, by contrast, would be associated with an output loss of  11.3 percent.2o 
The available evidence suggests that the costs of disinflation are temporary 
and are incurred over a comparatively short period.21  By contrast, the benefits 
of price stability (G), expressed as a percentage of GDP, are permanent. To 
compare costs and benefits, we consider the present value of the benefits in all 
future periods. Given a discount rate of  p,  the present value of the benefits 
works out at G/p. The reduction of inflation is beneficial if the permanent bene- 
fits of price stability exceed the annualized costs of disinflation:22 
(12)  G  > pur'+Q. 
Given a discount rate of p = 2.5 percent per annumZ3  and the above-mentioned 
values for the other parameters (a  = 4,  IT  = 2, cp  = 0.5), the breakeven point 
works out at G = 0.28. Hence, to summarize the result of  this section, the 
lasting benefits of price stability would have to be greater than 0.28 percent of 
GDP to warrant the costs of disinflation by 2 percentage points. In section 2.3 
we shall turn to the calculation of the benefits of price stability. 
This is real money. 
-Lucas  (1994) 
2.3  Benefits of Price Stability 
The interaction between the tax system and inflation has repercussions on 
many areas of  economic activity. In this section, we are concerned with esti- 
mating the welfare-theoretical benefits of  price stability. In this context, we 
consider the steady state effects on the following economic activities: (1) the 
intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving, (2) the demand for owner- 
occupied housing, (3) money demand and seigniorage, and (4) government 
debt service. 
We base our quantification of the benefits of price stability on a steady state 
with a stable and fully anticipated inflation rate of 2 percent per annumZ4  and 
20. The reduction of inflation by 3 percentage points (from 4.5 to 1.5 percent per annum) be- 
tween 1992 and 1995 was accompanied by an output loss of 6 to 7 percent. However, starting from 
this lower level, any further reduction in inflation is likely to involve higher costs. 
21. Ball (1994) finds evidence  suggesting that rapid disinflation is more favorable, whereas 
King (1996a) argues in favor of a gradual disinflation process. 
22. We are well aware in this context that this criterion derived from a present value concept 
treats the future worse than the present. Hence, there is a risk that too little importance is attached 
to future benefits and hence to future generations. This is why the discount rate, in cases of doubt, 
should tend to be set low, even though this remains ethically questionable from the point of view 
of intergenerational equity; see Issing (1996b). 
23. This rate is roughly in line with the difference between the real rate of interest under condi- 
tions of price stability and the growth rate of real potential production (see section 2.3). 
24. What is meant is an effective inflation rate of 2 percent, i.e., an inflation rate after adjustment 
for statistical measuring errors. 57  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
examine the comparative static effects of lowering that rate to zero. We  take 
into account both the direct benefits of reducing inflation-induced distortions 
and the indirect welfare effects emanating from the change in tax revenue ow- 
ing to the lowering of the inflation rate given the prevailing expenditure stance 
of the public authorities. 
Other advantages of  price stability are not included in our computations, 
although we certainly do not deem them to be insignificant (see the survey in 
Edey 1994; Fischer 1994b; King 1996b). The avoidance of distortions due to 
inflation is accompanied by enhancement of performance incentives and more 
efficient operation of  economic processes. This includes the greater informa- 
tive value of  relative prices, a better balanced financing structure, improved 
economic efficiency, and higher productivity. Furthermore, redistribution pro- 
cesses and redistribution conflicts due to inflation would be avoided, and the 
wastage of scarce resources in order to sidestep the adverse effects of inflation 
would cease. In addition, under conditions of  price stability the uncertainty 
engendered by inflation would diminish.25  The extent to which such improved 
underlying conditions influence the long-term growth path is outside the scope 
of our investigation. But as is shown in models of the new growth theory, price 
stability can also contribute to lastingly stronger economic growth (Black, 
Macklem, and Poloz 1994).26 
In computing the welfare effects, we  are largely following the approach 
adopted by Feldstein, although we have made a number of  modifications to 
take account of the special features of  the German tax system. Moreover, in 
calculating the indirect revenue effects, we do not set the parameter that mea- 
sures the deadweight loss of the tax system exogenously but derive it from 
the model. 
2.3.1 
The taxation of capital and of the earnings accruing from it involves welfare 
losses. The existing tax system admittedly gives rise to such distortions even 
if price stability obtains. However, the interaction of inflation and distortionary 
taxation results in an additional welfare loss, a “deadweight loss,” that derives 
from the fact that inflationary processes drive a “tax-inflation wedge” between 
the gross yield and the net return on capital. This-as  we shall show-reduces 
the real return on investment, impairs saving, and distorts the intertemporal 
allocation of consumption. Similarly, the elimination of a positive inflation rate 
is associated with deadweight gains. 
Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption and Saving 
25. This uncertainty depends, as mentioned above, in part on whether the central bank is aiming 
at the target of an inflation rule of zero or at price level stability; see subsection 2.2.2. 
26. Even a small increase in the pace of growth would generate a huge effect over time. If, in 
the event of a decline in the inflation rate of 2 percentage points, the real growth rate rose by 0.2 
percentage points (this is the magnitude that Grimes [1991] ascertained empirically in a cross- 
sectional analysis for 27 countries), given a difference of 2.5 percentage points between the real 
rate of interest and the real growth rate in the starting period, the present value of the increase in 
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Welfare-Theoretical Approach 
The starting point of  the analysis is a two-period overlapping generations 
model. In this model the following fundamental relationship exists between the 
savings of the young generation (S) and their later consumption in old age (C): 
(13)  s  =  pc. 
In this intertemporal budget equation, p  denotes the price of  future con- 
sumption. Given a real net payment of  interest on savings at a rate r over a 
period of  T years (Le., over one generation), the price of future consumption, 
expressed in terms of units of present consumption, is 
p  = (1 +  r)-T, 
r 
1+  r 
with E~~ = -  T-. 
As the elasticity cPr  indicates, an increase in the real net yield on savings leads 
to a decline in the price of retirement consumption. The price-quantity combi- 
nations in the three scenarios under investigation are designated as follows: 
No tax, no inflation  (Po, CJ 
Tax, no inflation  (PI9  CJ 
Tax and (2%) inflation  (p,, C,) 
As is explained in more detail in appendix A and illustrated by figure 2A. 1, 
under the welfare-theoretical approach to the quantification of the benefits of 
price stability, the following quantities (areas) are relevant: 
(15)  A  =  %(Pi - PO)(CO - 
In  the absence of  taxes and  inflation,  an economic agent may  save the 
amount So at the price po  in order to achieve the consumption level Co in old 
age. By the introduction of a tax on investment income, the real yield declines 
and the price of consumption rises to p,,  while the consumption level falls to 
C,. As a result the consumers' surplus decreases to the extent of the area A + 
B + D, and a tax yield amounting to the area B + D comes into being. The 
difference between the two areas, viz., the (Harberger) triangle A is, in terms 
of welfare economics, a deadweight loss of taxation. 
If, under the existing tax system, inflation is added (i.e., if the inflation rate 
rises from zero to, say, n = 2 percent), then the interaction of  distortionary 
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net yield and a further rise in the price of  future consumption to p,, whereas 
the level of  consumption falls to C,. Hence the consumers’ surplus drops by 
the area C + E, whereas the tax yield changes by  B -  E. The difference is 
again a deadweight loss, but its magnitude is no longer in line only with the 
“small triangle” of traditional welfare theory, which arises through the “disrup- 
tion” of a “first best” equilibrium. The deadweight loss of inflation is rather 
the trapezoid B + C, which may be much bigger and which comes into being 
through the extension, due to inflation, of the already existing tax-induced dis- 
tortion. On the return to price stability, there arises a correspondingly large 
deadweight gain. 
As will be demonstrated below, the change in the tax yield at zero inflation 
as measured by  the area B -  E is negative; that is, a shortfall in tax revenue 
occurs owing to the disappearance of inflation. Generally, it is assumed that 
the changed tax revenue is offset by a lump-sum tax, with a neutral effect in 
terms of  welfare accounting. This, however, is an unrealistic assumption. In 
actual fact, it is to be expected that the shortfall in tax revenue is offset by the 
introduction, or raising, of other taxes (at a given level of expenditure), which 
in their turn are associated with welfare-theoretical deadweight losses. If these 
offsetting taxes involve a deadweight loss per deutsche mark of  tax revenue 
amounting to A, the welfare gain of price stability will decrease to the extent 
of h(B -  E).*’ The overall benefit of a reduction in inflation then constitutes 
the sum of the direct deadweight gain and the indirect income effect: 
(20)  G,  = (B +  C) +  X(B - E). 
However, the form in which the tax losses due to the reduction in inflation 
would be offset, and the associated welfare effects, remain an open question. 
Feldstein assumes that X = 0.4 would be a reasonable “benchmark” value for 
the shadow price of taxation. By contrast, we calculate the parameter A directly 
from our model. More precisely, we approximate the deadweight loss of the 
German tax system by the ratio 
(21)  X,  =  A/(B +  D), 
which is the deadweight loss of capital income taxation per deutsche mark tax 
revenue in the regime of price stability. The overall inefficiency of the regime 
with tax and inflation is also of interest. It can be expressed by 
XC+n  = (A +  B +  C)/(D +  E), 
while the marginal inefficiency of inflation-induced taxes is defined by 
(23)  X,  = (B +  C)/(E - B) 
(see fig. 2A. 1 in appendix A). 
27. The parameter A can therefore be regarded as a measure of inefficiency of taxation; in the 
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The above-mentioned areas are, in each case, the product of a price compo- 
nent and a quantity component, which will have to be measured in the next sub- 
sections. 
Interest Rate and Price Effects 
in the event of an inflation rate of zero the real net yield amounts to 
(24)  r,  =  ro(l - 0). 
Given a real yield before tax of ro and a tax rate on investment income of 0, 
Given a positive inflation rate (T  = 2 percent), investment income is com- 
posed of a nominal and a real component. If the simple Fisher theorem applies, 
and if both components of investment income are taxed at the same rate, then 
the real net yield, in the case of inflation, is approximately** 
(25)  r2  = (ro +  ~)(1  - 0)  - T =  I, - TO. 
That is to say, the real rate of interest is reduced owing to inflation by  the 
amount 7~0.~~  In principle, this adverse effect of  inflation on real net interest 
rates could be prevented or lessened by indexing the tax system. But it is also 
conceivable that market adjustment reactions might ensure that the nominal 
interest rate (R)  not only increases to the extent of the inflation rate, as in the 
simple Fisher theorem, but also responds disproportionately fast: dR/dT > 1.30 




r2  = (ro +  ~  T  )  (1 - 0)  - T =  r, - no.  (26) 
The parameter o,  which will be very important hereafter, reflects the decline 
in the real yield after tax that would result if the inflation rate were increased 
by  1 percentage point; it can be interpreted as the effective marginal tax rate 
on the inflation-induced component of investment income. If  o  = 0,  the real 
and the inflation-induced components of investment income are treated alike 
in tax terms, and inflation exerts an unabated impact on the real net yield. If 
o  = 0, inflation has no effect on the real net yield. After the insertion of equa- 
tion (24), equation (26)  can also be expressed as 
28. Furthermore, it is assumed that the gross real interest rate does not include any inflation- 
induced risk premium and that a Tobin effect (asset substitution between fixed capital and money 
on account of inflation), if any, can be disregarded. 
29. E.g., given a gross yield of  10 percent and a tax rate of 50 percent, the net yield under 
conditions of price stability would be 5 percent. With 2 percent inflation, the nominal gross yield 
would rise to 12 percent, but the real net yield would fall to 4  percent. It should be borne in mind 
in this connection that the coupon is subject to tax, with the result that if the buying rate is above 
par, the net real interest rate on final maturity decreases even further (and vice versa). 
30. See Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976). Given dRldp = 1/(1 -  O),  the effect of inflation 
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r2  =  r,(l - t), 
where t is the effective average tax rate under conditions of inflation: 
0  t  =  @+ -IT. 
r0 
For Germany, the average real gross yield on fixed capital between 1991 and 
1995  works out at ro = 10.8 percent, according to internal computations by 
the B~ndesbank.~' 
The profits of German corporations distributed to domestic individuals are 
subject to a variety of taxes: trade tax (on returns and capital), corporation tax, 
investment income tax, property tax, income tax, and the solidarity surcharge 
(to finance German ~nification).~~  But in contrast to the situation in the United 
States, corporation tax and investment income tax (as well as the applicable 
solidarity surcharge) are set off against income tax, in the form of a tax credit. 
As can be seen from appendix table 2D.1, the average tax burden in this model 
calculation amounts to t = 60.7 percent.33  Thus it follows from equation (27) 
that the real net yield is r, = 10.8(1 -  0.607) = 4.24 percent. 
This yield was achieved with an average inflation rate of 3.3 percent between 
1991 and 1995. If it is assumed that the inflation rates recorded in the statistics 
overstate the actual increases in  then it is possible to calculate for the 
period in question, as Feldstein did for the United States, an average effective 
inflation rate of  IT  = 2 percent. The real net yield that would result in the 
absence of inflation can now be computed from equation (26): 
(26')  r,  =  r2 +  ITW. 
In order to determine the effective tax rate on nominal investment income (w), 
we take account of the depreciation and the interestpaid in the corporate sector 
and the interest received in the private sector.35 
w  =  TZ - Tb  +  T'b'. 
3 1. The gross income of nonfinancial enterprises (excluding also the housing sector, agriculture, 
and fishery, as well as imputed entrepreneurs'  earnings) in relation to net fixed capital at replace- 
ment costs is used as an indicator of  the fixed capital yield. In order to prevent distortions on 
account of German unification, we will henceforth use western German data (old Lhder)  for the 
period 1991-95  where necessary. 
32. The following calculations refer to the stylized tax regulations prevailing in 1995 and 1996. 
Starting in 1997 the investment income tax was cancelled; furthermore, the abolition of the trade 
tax on capital is envisaged. 
33. The average tax burden on the retained profits of a domestic corporation works out at 64.3 
percent, and that on the earnings of a partnership at a calculated rate of 55.3 percent. 
34. The consumer price index is likely to be upwardly distorted on account of a product substitu- 
tion bias, a quality bias, a new goods bias, and an outlet substitution bias (see Edey 1994). 
35. In the private sector Feldstein also takes account of the effect of taxing capital gains, but 
this plays only a subordinate role under German tax legislation (in income taxation there are so- 
called speculation periods of  six months and two years, respectively, for securities transactions 
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In this equation, T is the marginal tax rate for distributed corporate profits 
and T’  is the (weighted) marginal income tax rate, including the solidarity sur- 
charge. Moreover, z denotes the present value of tax depreciation, b the debt 
ratio of  enterprises (the ratio of borrowed capital bearing interest at market 
rates to total capital), and b’  the ratio of shares and debt securities in house- 
holds’ portfolios. 
Since the depreciation is effected in order to calculate the taxable earnings 
on the basis of historical purchase prices (and not of replacement costs), infla- 
tion reduces the present value of depreciation (z)  and thus increases the effec- 
tive tax rate. Auerbach (1978) showed that capital costs increase by the amount 
TZ  if the inflation rate rises by  1 percentage point. The present value depends 
on the write-off period for tax purposes of the asset in question (Ts),  as well as 
on the depreciation method used and the discounting factor (nominal market 
interest rate after tax). As an approximation to the customary depreciation al- 
lowances, we use the formula 
As appendix table 2D.1 shows, with the assumptions underlying our consid- 
erations the marginal tax burden on the distributed profits of a domestic corpo- 
ration amounts to T = 48 percent.36  If, moreover, one assumes an average write- 
off period of  T, = 10 years, given a real net yield of  r, = 4.24 percent, as 
calculated above, and an inflation rate of  2 percent, the present value of  tax 
depreciation works out at z = 0.76; that is to say, the reduction of the inflation 
rate by  1 percentage point would increase the real yield by 72  = 0.37 percent- 
age points. 
This positive effect on the real yield is counteracted by the tax deductibility 
of nominal interest costs. If  every percentage point of inflation increases the 
nominal  cost of  corporate indebtedness by  1 percent (see Feldstein  1997, 
133-34;  Mishkin 1992), then the real interest costs remain unchanged whereas 
the enterprise obtains an additional deduction option when calculating its tax- 
able profits. In the case of an inflation rate of zero, this relief of earnings would 
disappear. Given a corporate debt ratio of b = 45 per~ent,~’  the reduction of 
the inflation rate by  1 percentage point leads to a decline in the real yield of 
Tb = 0.22 percentage points. 
In the private sector, income taxes are likewise related to nominal interest 
income, which gives rise to taxation of fictitious profits. Hence, a reduction in 
the inflation rate lowers the effective tax rate and raises the real net yield. If 
the real gross yield is independent of  the level of the inflation rate, then the 
36. The distributed profits of a partnership are subject to a marginal tax burden of  identical size. 
On the other hand, the marginal tax burden on the retained profits of a corporation, at 57 percent, 
is actually even higher (see appendix table 2D.1). 
37. This figure refers  to  the  average corporation’s liabilities  other than  its  provisions  (see 
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real net yield falls to the extent of the marginal tax rate. On the basis of a ratio 
of  shares and debt securities to households’ net financial assets of  b’  = 43 
percent,38  and on the assumption of  a weighted marginal income tax rate (in- 
cluding the solidarity surcharge) of  T’  = 37.6 percent,39  in the event of a de- 
cline in the inflation rate of  1 percentage point, a rise in real net interest rates 
of T’b’ = 0.16 percentage points occurs. 
If  one combines these three components, the outcome is an effective mar- 
ginal tax rate on inflation-induced capital income of o  = 0.3 l.  The upshot of 
this, in accordance with equation (26’), for the real net yield with an inflation 
rate of zero is r, = 4.24 + 2*0.31 = 4.87 percent. According to this estimate, 
the real net yield would rise by 0.63 percentage points on account of the disap- 
pearance of an inflation rate of 2 percent.40 
If  one assumes a time span of  T = 27 years for the average period elapsing 
between the saving of the young generation and their consumption in old age,4’ 
the following prices result from equation (14) for retirement consumption in 
the three aforementioned scenarios: 
Scenario  Interest Rate (%)  Price 
No tax, no inflation  ro = 10.80  po = 0.0627 
Tax, no inflation  rl = 4.87  pI  = 0.2771 
Tax and (2%) inflation  rz = 4.24  p2 = 0.3255 
A First Approximation 
Given the interest rates and price changes between the two regimes derived 
above, we are now  able to give a first and rough estimate of  the benefits of 
price stability. For this purpose we  need an approximation of  the change in 
retirement consumption (C, -  C2).  From equation (13) the following expres- 
sion for the consumption reaction can be derived: 
P1  - P2 
cp,  orC, - C,  =  c2  ECp 3  s dP 
PP  P2 
dC  =  ---E  (31) 
where ccp  denotes the compensated elasticity of retirement consumption with 
respect to its 
Using the Slutsky decomposition and equations (13) and (14), the unobserv- 
able compensated price elasticity of retirement consumption (cCp)  and the un- 
38. The net financial assets are calculated without mortgage debts (see Deutsche Bundesbank 
39. This rate results from a (weighted)  income tax rate of 35 percent and a solidarity surcharge 
40. For the United States, Feldstein ascertains a rise of 0.49 percentage points in the real net 
41. For the United States, Feldstein assumes a period of 30 years. 
42. Regarding the compensated demand function, see Silberberg (1978) and Varian (1984). 
1996a; 1996b. 25-47). 
of  7.5 percent (see appendix table 2D.1). 
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compensated interest rate elasticity of the saving of the young generation (qJ 
are related through 
where uY  is the income effect caused by  a change in the interest rate; it is 
measured by  the ratio of  the saving of the young generation to their (exoge- 
nous) wage and salary income. In this subsection, we assume that saving is 
completely interest inelastic and we ignore the income effect, resulting in  E~~ 
= -1. 
As  equation (B9) of  appendix B  shows, in the overlapping generations 
model the following link exists between the saving of the young generation 
(S,) and aggregate private saving (S): 
(33)  S  =  S,(l - q),  whereq  = (1 +  n +  g)-'. 
In this equation,  n + g = 2.2 percent is the longer term average growth rate of 
real wages and salaries (and at the same time of  the real domestic product) 
between 1986  and 1994.43  If one also bears in mind that private saving accounts 
for a share S = 9.3 percent in  GDP, the saving of  the young generation is 
estimated as S,  = 20.9 percent of  GDP, giving C, = S,/p, = 64.1 percent 
of GDP.44 
Plugging this value into equation (31) and recalling from the previous sec- 
tion that we estimated the relative change of the price for retirement consump- 
tion as (p, -  p,)/p, = 14.9 percent, we obtain the following increase in retire- 
ment consumption: C, - C,  = 9.55 percent of  GDP. In conjunction with 
equations (16) and (17) we obtain 2.05 + 0.23 = 2.28 percent of GDP as a 
rule-of-thumb estimate of the trapezoid area B + C. 
To  make the factors behind this calculation more explicit, we may alterna- 
tively use the following simple but instructive formula: 
PI  - Po.  P2 - PI  B+  C =  S, 
(34)  PI  P2 
=  0.209 * 0.774 * 0.149  =  2.4% of GDP, 
which largely confirms the result derived above. Equation (34) decomposes the 
welfare gains of price stability into three factors. The first, saving of the young, 
is the base for capital income taxation. The second factor is the change in the 
price of retirement consumption due to capital income taxation. The third fac- 
43. In this case, the average rate of  the last five years is distorted downward owing to German 
unification, which is why we use a 10-year average here. 
44. Alternatively, the saving of the young generation can also be determined using eq. (B5)  of 
appendix B. In this way, the estimated value of the share of saving of the young generation in the 
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tor measures the price increase due to (2 percent) inflation. This factor itself 
can be decomposed approximately into the rate of  (dis)inflation (T),  the im- 
plicit inflation tax rate (0)  defined in equation (26), and the average number of 
years until retirement (T): 
(34') 
Hence, the welfare costs of inflation tend to be high if the saving rate is high, 
if  capital income is taxed heavily, or if  the tax system is not indexed. All of 
these factors apply to the German economy and may  explain-besides  still 
deeply rooted historical experiences with hyperinflation and more recent in- 
flation periods in the seventies and early eighties-the  pronounced inflation 
aversion and stability culture of the German population. 
. Thus on the basis of this first approximation we may conclude that the elimi- 
nation of  a low inflation rate of  2 percent produces a direct welfare gain of 
more than 2 percent of GDP. This ready-reckoner admittedly neglects any sub- 
stitution effects and income effects of the change in interest rates. Moreover, 
the welfare effects of compensatory tax revenue changes are not yet included. 
This is the subject of the next subsection. 
Quantity Effects 
For a more exact calculation of the quantity effects we need the uncompen- 
sated interest elasticity of saving (qsr)  as well as the saving ratio of the young 
generation (a,).  As outlined in more detail in appendix B, from the overlapping 
generations model we obtain qsr  = 0.25 for the uncompensated saving elastic- 
ity, implying qsp  = -0.228.  Since on average gross wages account for 56 per- 
cent of GDP, we get a, = SJGDP = 0.209/0.56 = 0.374. Therefore, equation 
(32) yields the value E~~  = -[1 -  0.374 -  (-0.228)]  = -0.854  for the price 
elasticity  of  retirement  consumption. This  in  turn  yields  C,  - C,  = 
(-0.149)*0.642*(-0.854)  = 8.16 percent of  GDP for the change in retire- 
ment consumption and, by  the same procedure, C,,  - C,  = 49.9 percent of 
GDP. Finally, equation (13) provides the value C,  = 64.3 percent of  GDP.45 
Combining the estimated price and quantity effects, areas A to E can now be 
quantified from equations (15) through (19): 
A = 5.35 percent of GDP 
B = 1.75 percent of GDP 
C = 0.20 percent of GDP 
D = 13.79 percent of GDP 
E = 3.11 percent of GDP 
45. This assumes that the share of saving of  the young generation is roughly the same under 
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Owing to the disappearance of the distortions in the intertemporal allocation 
of  consumption and saving alone, the direct welfare gain of  price stability 
amounts to B + C = 1.95 percent of GDP. 
However, tax revenue would decrease by B -  E = -  1.36 percent of GDP. 
The deadweight loss per deutsche mark of tax revenue on the taxation of  in- 
vestment income is estimated at A,  =  A/(B + D) = 5.35/15.54 = 0.34. If  one 
assumes that the above-computed tax loss in the case of price stability is offset 
by raising taxes with a similar shadow price, then the overall benefit of reduc- 
ing inflation amounts on balance, pursuant to equation (20), to 
G,  =  1.95+ 0.34*(-1.36)  =  1.48%ofGDP. 
The Problem of  Indexation 
The  shadow price of  capital income taxes under conditions of  inflation 
Act,  = (A + B + C)/(D + E)  = 0.43, as calculated from equation (22), is 
distinctly higher than under price stability, which is A,  = 0.34. The reason is 
the exceptionally high shadow price of  the implicit inflation tax, defined in 
equation (23), which turns out to be A,  = (B + C)/(E -  B) = 1.43,  demonstra- 
ting yet again that inflation is an extremely inefficient way of generating gov- 
ernment revenue. Hence, the principle of causation as well as welfare analysis 
suggests that monetary policy and not tax policy should be primarily respon- 
sible for eliminating the highly inefficient inflation tax. 
Nevertheless, it is sometimes argued that the welfare gain deriving from the 
reduction of inflation could be accomplished equally well by indexing the tax 
system. This argument is correct only in principle. To attain the same real yield 
under conditions of inflation as in a state of  price stability-that  is, r,-the 
tax rate would have to be made dependent on the inflation rate. The taxation 
of  capital income would have to be shaped in such a way  that the effective 
average tax rate is a diminishing function of the (true, not necessarily the mea- 
sured) inflation rate; that is, the following equation would have to apply: 
w  0  =  t - -T  =  0.607 - 2.877~. 
rn 
Given an inflation rate of 2 percent, the average tax rate oft = 60.7 percent 
would have  to fall by  5.7 percentage points to 0  = 55 percent in order to 
attain the same effective taxation as in the case of  price stability. Since r,, is 
not necessarily constant, and since w likewise hinges on variables rather than 
constants, the indexation formula would have to be adjusted continually. That 
is only one of many reasons why indexation is not a practicable alternative to 
price ~tability.~~  In the absence of  inflation, however, the lower effective tax 
rate would materialize “of its own accord.” 
46. A more detailed discussion of the problems posed by the indexation of  the tax system can 
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The Effect of Social Security Contributions 
The analysis so far has implicitly assumed that a fully funded system is in 
place for providing old-age pensions. This assumption allows us to keep the 
model relatively simple. However, it would be interesting to check whether the 
results obtained above survive if we take into account that actually many retir- 
ees receive a significant amount of exogenous income through an unfunded 
(“pay as you go”) system. 
For this purpose we  assume that the young pay  a fraction of  their gross 
wages as contributions to the social security system (yW), receiving yWlq 
when retired, where q = (1 + n + g)-T  and n + g is the implicit rate of return 
in a pay-as-you-go system. (In a fully funded system the rate of return would 
be r.) Moreover, we assume that the old generation leaves “indirect bequests” 
(R)  to the government and the young generation receives transfers (2)  from the 
government that are not directly linked to R. As explained in appendix C, the 
budget constraint of the extended overlapping generations model linking sav- 
ings (S) of the young to their retirement consumption (C) changes from equa- 
tion (13) to 
S  =  pC-  -(yW-  P  R). 
4 
From national accounts data for the period 1991-95  we get the value y = 
0.15. The parameter R = O.1OGDP was calibrated such that the model approxi- 
mately reproduces the income and expenditure account of  the private sector 
for the stated period. 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  these  extensions  leave  the  results  practically  un- 
changed. The reduced distortion of  intertemporal allocation of consumption 
yields benefits amounting to 
G,  =  1.87 +  0.40*(-0.91)  =  1.50%of GDP, 
which is almost the same result as that obtained on the basis of the simpler 
model. 
2.3.2  Demand for Owner-Occupied Housing 
Owner-occupied dwellings are given preferential treatment in income taxa- 
tion, although they are fundamentally regarded as a consumer good.47  Never- 
theless, some parts of  the acquisition costs are allowed to be deducted from 
taxes, while the notional rental value (which represents implied investment 
income) is not subject to taxation. (In contrast to the situation in the United 
47. The following comments are based on former tax legislation up to 1995, excluding the tax 
relief on loan interest (which was limited to three years) up to the end of  1994 as well as  the 
special assistance measures in eastern Germany. The system of assistance for residential property 
that was reformed by the Owner-Occupied Housing Allowance Act of 1 January 1996 has not been 
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States, however, debt interest cannot be deducted from taxes.) This results in a 
subsidy-induced distortion of the demand for residential property as well as in 
a major shortfall in tax revenue.4s 
For reasons similar to those in subsection 2.3.1 with regard to the dead- 
weight loss of inflation, the following trapezoid measures the inflation-induced 
deadweight loss in the case of owner-occupied housing: 
(35) 
where H  is the demand for owner-occupied housing and R represents the user 
costs per deutsche mark of invested capital. 
The Price and Quantity Component 
property would amount to 
(36)  R,  =  r, +  m +  6, 
where m + 6 is the sum of maintenance costs and depreciation per deutsche 
mark of employed capital, which we put at 4 percent. Given a real gross rate 
of return in the enterprise sector of r, = 10.8 percent, the user costs amount to 
R, = 14.8 percent. By  contrast, under present tax legislation the following 
calculation is relevant for a married couple given inflation:49 
(36’) 
where p designates the share of the mortgage debt in the value of the house, 
i,  the nominal mortgage rate, and h the tax concession per deutsche mark of 
invested capital. Accordingly,  the annual user costs of owner-occupied housing 
are the sum of  the (non-tax-deductible) interest payments on the mortgage 
debt, the opportunity costs of  the invested capital, and the maintenance and 
depreciation costs. The tax saving due to the possibilities of deduction for tax 
purposes and the inflation-induced increase in the value of the property are to 
be counted against this. 
Under the previous form of Section 10 of the Income Tax Code, 6 percent 
of the (maximum DM 330,000) acquisition costs of owner-occupied dwellings 
(which were completed in  1992 or later) may be deducted for tax purpose for 
GH,  =  [(R, - R,) +  5’z(Rl  - R,)I(H, - HI), 
In the absence of taxes and inflation, the implicit rental costs of residential 
R,  =  pi,,,  + (1 - k)(r,  +  T)  + (m  +  6) - 7’h  - T, 
48. A further benefit of price stability is the prevention of the “front loading” problem. This 
liquidity effect makes the acquisition of residential property more difficult since-given  positive 
inflation-the  real debt service is highest at the start of the period and later decreases; see the 
report of the Expert Commission on Housing Policy (Expertenkommission zur Wohnungspolitik 
1994, 162 ff.). Given price stability, the real burden would, by contrast, be equally high throughout 
the period of the mortgage. Croushore (1992) estimates the benefit of this effect alone-assuming 
a reduction of inflation by 2 percentage points-to  be between 0.06 and 0.12 percent of GDP. 
49. Owner-occupied houses until 1996 were, in principle, also subject to general (net) wealth 
tax. Because of the low values to be assessed and the nominal value of the mortgage debts to be 
counted against them, however, very little wealth tax or none at all was due. Profits from sales are 
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an initial period of  four years and 5 percent for a further four years.Jo  Over 
eight years this assistance adds up DM  145,200. In addition, the home buyers’ 
child benefit of DM  1,000 per child is deducted from liable tax. In the case of 
two children, this produces an amount of DM 16,000,  which-given  a tax rate 
of  T’ = 37.6 percent-corresponds  to a gross deductible amount of  around 
DM 42,600. In total, this produces a reduction in the tax base of DM  187,800 
for the entire period in which assistance  is granted. If average acquisition costs 
are assumed to be DM 373,000,5L  this corresponds to around 50 percent of the 
acquisition costs. Both marriage partners can make use of this assistance once. 
This is taken into account by halving the useful economic life of the property 
to 25 years. Spread over that period, the tax-deductible amount is h = 50/25 = 
2 percent per annum of  the acquisition costs. Given a share of borrowing in 
capital spending on housing construction of  p = 60 percent and a nominal 
annual mortgage rate of 8.5 percent (at 2 percent inflation), equation (36) re- 
sults in R, = 0.6*8.5 + (1 -  0.6)*(4.24 + 2) -  0.376*2 + 4 -  2 = 8.85 
percent. 
Assuming that the simple Fisher relationship (di,/dn = 1) applies to the 
mortgage rate, and also considering the fact that according to equation (26) 
dr,/d.rr = -w,  it follows from equation (36) that dR,/dn = -w(l -  p).  This 
assumes that h is independent of  the inflation rate. Given a lack of inflation, 
the user costs would hence rise to 
(37)  R,  =  R, +  n~(l  - p). 
Since w = 0.31 was calculated above, it follows that R, = 8.84 + 2*0.31* 
(1 -  0.6) = 9.09 percent; that is, the elimination of  an inflation rate of  2 
percent would increase the user costs of owner-occupied housing by 0.24 per- 
centage points. The welfare effect (34) becomes GH,  = 0.0583(H2 -  HI).  The 
increase in user costs that are distorted downward by inflation results in a de- 
cline in the demand for housing, which leads to a corresponding reduction of 
capital misallocation. We approximate this quantity effect by 
where cHR  is the compensated interest rate elasticity of  capital spending on 
housing construction. Dopke (1996) estimates a long-term value of  0.14 for 
the uncompensated interest rate elasticity. This corresponds to a compensated 
50. Since 1991, an income limit for a singlekouple of DM 120,000/240,000  has applied to basic 
assistance and home buyers’ child benefit. 
51. Between 1991 and 1995, pure construction costs amounted to an average of DM 2,500 per 
square meter. This gives construction costs of around DM 305,000, assuming an average floor area 
of  122m2.  Furthermore, DM 50,000 in real estate costs are added to this, assuming that a property 
has an area of 200111’  and a real estate price of DM 250 per square meter. Finally, assuming ancil- 
lary costs of  around 5 percent of the acquisition costs results in the above-mentioned value of 
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elasticity of around E~~ = 0.25.52  A ratio of 1.7 between the value of the owner- 
occupied housing stock and GDP thus gives H2 -  H, = 1.20 percent of GDP. 
In conjunction with the price effect, the direct benefit of price stability with 
owner-occupied housing is GH,  = 0.07 percent of GDP. 
The Indirect Revenue Effect 
The indirect revenue effect is defined as 
(39)  GH2 = (HI - H,)r,,O. 
A fall in demand for owner-occupied housing of  1.20 percent of  GDP was 
produced by equation (38). The capital stock in the enterprise sector increases 
by the same amount and generates a gross rate of return of r, = 10.8 percent 
and a net yield (without inflation) of  rl = 4.87 percent. This corresponds to 
an  effective average rate  of  taxation of  0  = 55  percent;  that  is,  GH2  = 
1.20*0.108*0.55 = 0.07 percent of GDP. If  the deadweight loss per deutsche 
mark of tax revenue calculated above is likewise put at A,  = 0.34 here, a net 
benefit is produced on balance (given price stability) of 
G,  =  GHl  +  AcGH2 =  0.07 +  0.34*0.07  =  0.09%of GDP. 
2.3.3  Money Demand and Seigniorage 
The Direct Welfare Effect 
Inflation  increases  the  alternative costs  of  holding  non-interest-bearing 
money balances and lowers the real demand for money below its optimal level. 
Since the real costs of  an increase in the money stock are virtually nil, the 
optimal money stock, according to Friedman (1969), is that in which the op- 
portunity costs of cash holdings are zero, that is,  IT*) + IT*  = 0.53 
With the current system of taxation and given 2 percent inflation, the oppor- 
tunity costs of cash holdings are r, + IT  = 4.24 + 2.0 = 6.24 percent. Given 
a zero inflation rate, these costs fall to rl = 4.87 percent. A Harberger analysis 
of the money demand produces the following trapezoid as the welfare gain due 
to a lowering of the inflation rate from effectively 2 percent to zero: 
52. The relationship  E  = q + E*(H/Y)  applies between the compensated (E) and uncompen- 
sated (q)  elasticity, where E is the income elasticity of  the capital spending on housing construc- 
tion and H/Y is the ratio of capital spending on housing construction to disposable income. With 
the income elasticity of 1.26 estimated by Dopke (1996) and a ratio of capital spending on housing 
construction to disposable income of  10 percent, this gives E = 0.14 + 1.26 * 0.10 =  0.25 for the 
compensated elasticity. 
53. The value rl = 4.87 percent has been determined for the real return given a zero inflation 
rate. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the real yield is a linear function of the inflation rate, 
to which dr/dm = -0 applies, the optimal inflation rate according to Friedman is produced as the 
solution of  r, -  0.31m* + P*  = 0; i.e., m* = -7  percent. If there are no lump-sum taxes, it is 
theoretically possible, however, that the inflation rate is positive as part of  an optimal tax mix 
provided that money is regarded as an end good and not as an intermediate good. See also the 
papers by Phelps (1973) and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991). 71  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
(40)  ‘M,  =  -  +  1/2(r2  +  -  - M2); 
that is, GMl  = 0.0556(M1  -  MJ. The change in the money demand can be 
approximated by 
r,  +  n - r, 
r2 + n  M,  - M,  =  ‘Mi  M2  ‘ 
According to our estimations, the interest rate elasticity of  the demand for 
money (currency in circulation and required reserves) is E,  = 0.25 in absolute 
value. Given a 9 percent share of these monetary components in GDP, it fol- 
lows that M, -  M, = 0.50 percent of GDP. The product of the price and the 
quantity effect gives the direct welfare gain of  price stability in the money 
demand; it amounts to just GM,  = 0.03 percent of GDP. 
The Indirect Revenue Effect 
The indirect revenue effect of reduced money demand is made up of three 
components. First, the reduction of the “inflation tax” to real money balances 
(M)  leads to a loss of monetary seigniorage. This implies a welfare loss since 
other distorting taxes have  to be increased. The (active) seigniorage to the 
amount of 54 
(42)  S  =  nM 
reacts to changes in the inflation rate in accordance with dS/dn = M + n(dM/ 
dn).  After some transformations using d(r, + n)/dn = 1 -  o,  this may be 
written as 
(43)  1 - €Mi(l  - w)- 
r2 + n 
Assuming a ratio of  money balances (currency in circulation and minimum 
reserves) to GDP of 9 percent and an interest rate elasticity of money demand 
in absolute terms of E~,  = 0.25, the loss of seigniorage if there is price stability 
comes to dS = 0.17 percent of GDP. 
Second, an income effect results from the fact that less capital and more real 
money balances are held if there is price stability. The value M, -  M, = 0.50 
percent of GDP has been determined above for the rise in the money demand. 
In the enterprise sector this capital earns a gross return of  r,,  = 10.8 percent 
and is subject (given price stability) to taxation at 0 = 55 percent. The loss of 
income is thus 
(44)  dK  = (MI - M,)r,,@; 
that is, dK = 0.03 percent of GDP. 
54. Seigniorage also arises in a growing economy independent of the rate of inflation (passive 
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Third, the government is in a position to reduce interest-bearing  debt instru- 
ments to the amount of the increased cash holdings. Although this is a one-off 
effect, it permanently reduces the government’s debt service by 
(45)  dB =  rn,<M,  - MI), 
where 
(46)  rng = (1 - 7’)y - ?r 
is the real rate of interest on the public debt. Assuming that the ratio of debt 
service to public debt is y = 7.8 percent, and given a rate of taxation of T‘  = 
37.6 percent, there is a real interest rate of  rng  = 2.87 percent. The income 
effect thus comes to dB = 0.01 percent of GDP. The total loss of government 
income if there is price stability is therefore 
(47)  GM2 = -dS - dK +  dB; 
that is, GM2  = -0.19  percent of GDP. Using the same shadow price of taxation 
as before yields a small negative benefit of  money demand under price sta- 
bility: 
G,  =  GM,  +  XcGM2 =  0.03 +  0.34*(-0.19)  = -0.04%ofGDP. 
2.3.4  Government Debt Service 
This subsection considers the welfare effect that results from the fact that 
higher real rates of interest also increase the real costs of the government’s  debt 
service. A fully anticipated inflation leaves the real gross interest rate on the 
public debt unchanged, whereas the inflation premium is subject to income 
tax. A lower inflation rate hence does not reduce the pretax cost of debt ser- 
vice-that  is, it does not produce a direct advantage-but  it does reduce the 
tax revenue accruing from the (eligible) interest rate payments on the public 
debt. This requires a compensatory increase of other taxes. 
The starting point for quantifying this effect is the following budget equa- 
tion for the change in the level of debt (D): 
(48)  AD =  G - T + (5  +  ~)(l  - T’)D, 
where rg  is the real gross interest rate on the public debt and T’  is the marginal 
rate of taxation. In equilibrium the public debt grows at the same rate as nomi- 
nal GDP; that is, AD = D(n + g + IT). Combining this equilibrium condition 
with the above budget equation produces the following expression for the tax 
revenue: 
(49)  T  = [(l - T’)($  +  IT) - (n +  g +  T)]D  +  G. 
Differentiation of this budget constraint with respect to the inflation rate gives 
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Table 2.3  Benefits of Price Stability: Reducing Inflation from 2 Percent to Zero 
(change as percent of GDP) 
Welfare Effect 
Memo Item: 
Item  Direct  Indirect  Overall  United States 
Consumption timing  1.95  -0.47  1.48  0.95 
Money demand  0.03  -0.06  -0.04  -0.03 
Debt service  -  -0.12  -0.12  -0.10 
Overall benefit  2.04  -0.63  1.41  1.04 
Housing demand  0.07  0.02  0.09  0.22 
Memo item: United States  1.14  -0.10 
Given government debt of  D = 48 percent of GDP on average over the years 
1991-95,  dr  = 2 percentage points produces a change of dT = 0.36 percent 
of  GDP. This fall in  tax revenue resulting from the elimination of  inflation 
must be offset by  compensatory tax increases, which gives rise to a (nega- 
tive) benefit: 
G,  =  0.34*(-0.36)  = -0.12%  of GDP. 
2.3.5 
The benefits of  a zero inflation rate from the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption (GJ, the demand for owner-occupied housing (GJ,  the demand 
for money  (GJ,  and  the government's debt service (G,)  are combined in 
table 2.3. 
Accordingly, the reduction of  an (anticipated, equilibrium, and effective) 
inflation rate from 2 percent to zero results in a benefit of 1.41 percent of GDP 
year by  year. This benefit is primarily the outcome of  preventing inflation- 
induced distortions in the intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving 
(1.48 percent of  GDP). The correction of  the distortions in the demand for 
owner-occupied housing makes a net contribution amounting to 0.09 percent 
of GDP. The slight benefit in the case of money demand is overcompensated  by 
the associated shortfalls in government income, resulting on balance in costs 
amounting to 0.04 percent of GDP. The lack of the alleviating financing effect 
of inflation in the servicing of public debt leads by itself to further costs, which 
are estimated at 0.12 percent of GDP. Just under one-third of the direct welfare 
gains amounting to 2.04 percent of GDP is used up again by indirect revenue 
shortfalls. 
During the years  1991-95  the statistically measured inflation rate in Ger- 
many came to an average of 3.3 percent. On account of the lack of precision 
in statistical measuring, it is not possible to state beyond doubt whether this 
corresponds to an effective inflation rate of  2 percent. There is hence some 
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Fig. 2.1  Benefits of price stability 
amount of uncertainty regarding the actual size of the “disinflation potential.” 
As figure 2.1 shows, the benefit of price stability is a nonlinear function of the 
size of reduction in inflation.  Assuming a reduction in inflation of 3 percentage 
points (which would then roughly correspond to a measured inflation rate of 
zero), rather than of  2 percentage points, the benefit increases from 1.41 to 
1.78 percent of GDP.  Conversely, a reduction in the inflation rate by  only 1 
percentage point would still produce a sizable benefit of 0.85 percent of GDP. 
By way of approximation, the relationship between the size of the reduction in 
inflation (IT) and the benefit as a percentage of GDP (G) may be expressed by 
where 5 = 0.5 describes this relationship quite well. 
Comparing the results for Germany with Feldstein’s for the United States 
reveals greater differences, above all, in terms of the intertemporal allocation 
of consumption. At  1.95 percent of  GDP (according to our calculation), the 
direct welfare gain in this component is almost twice as large as Feldstein’s, at 
1.02 percent. In order to explain this difference, the direct benefit of  price 
stability in consumption allocation has been broken down into the product of 
four factors in table 2.4: the relative price effect (RPE), the interest rate elastic- 
ity of consumption, the relative savings of the young generation, and the share 
of private saving in GDP. As this table shows, the differences in the first three 
of those effects are comparatively small and they mutually compensate each 
other. The greater benefit of price stability in our calculation hence ultimately 
rests on the fact that the saving ratio (as a percentage of GDP) is almost twice 
as high in Germany as it is in the United States. 
The higher saving ratio in Germany also largely explains the greater (nega- 
tive) indirect income effect in our calculation. Putting the saving ratio in our 
calculation at 5 percent for Germany, too, would produce a direct benefit in 
consumption allocation of  1.26 percent of GDP (compared with  1.02 percent 
for the United States) and an indirect income effect of  -0.22  percent (-0.10 75  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
Table 2.4  Comparison of Results with the United States 
Relative  Interest  Savings  Saving  Direct 
Price  Rate  of Young  Ratio  Benefit 
Effect'  Elasticity  Generation  (%)  (% of GDP) 
Country  WE)  (I&,l)  (s,/S,)  (SJGDP)  (Gc,) 
Germany  0.109  0.854  2.251  9.30  1.95 
United States  0.092  1.230  1.800  5.00  1.02 
Ratio (Germany/U.S.)  1.19  0.69  1.25  1.86  1.91 
percent). Despite all the other differences between the systems of taxation and 
the structural and behavioral parameters in the two economies, the overall ben- 
efit of a reduction of the inflation rate by 2 percentage points-given  matching 
saving ratios-would  be almost as large, at 0.94 percent of  GDP, as for the 
United States (1.04 percent). Hence, it is the high saving rate in Germany, 
coupled with capital income taxes, that explains the large costs of even moder- 
ate rates of inflation. 
2.3.6  The Risks: Some Sensitivity Calculations 
Our calculations of the scale of  the benefit due to price stability rely on a 
number of simplifying assumptions. Furthermore, some of the assumed quanti- 
tative values for the structural and behavioral parameters of  the German econ- 
omy are attended by considerable uncertainties. Appendix table 2D.2 contains 
an overview of all parametric assumptions (benchmark values) and a compari- 
son with the coefficients assumed by Feldstein for the United States. 
In order to obtain some initial points of reference for the sensitivity of the 
calculations to the assumptions that have been made, we have calculated each 
coefficient with alternative lower and upper values deviating from the bench- 
mark. The range of  these values was chosen to correspond to what we felt 
subjectively to be roughly two standard  deviation^.^^ As the results of  these 
calculations show in appendix table 2D.3, varying the coefficients changes the 
overall benefit comparatively little; most results remain within the range of 
1.41 2 0.10 percent of GDP. The benefit of price stability that has been esti- 
mated thus appears to be quite robust in terms of the parametric assumptions 
that have been made. 
An exception to this is the length of the discounting period. If the period is 
reduced (increased) from T = 27 to T = 24 (30) years, the benefit of  price 
stability falls (rises) to  1.30 (1.51) percent of  GDP. Another very important 
parameter is the average rute oftaxation on distributed profits (t = 60.7 per- 
cent); a 3 percentage point reduction lowers the overall benefit to 1.31 percent 
of GDP, whereas an increase by the same amount raises the overall benefit of 
55. For a normally distributed random variable, the stated interval includes the actual value with 
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Table 2.5  Benefits of Price Stability: Simulation (change as percent of GDP) 
Item 
Standard 
Mean Value  Deviation  Median  Skewnessn 
Consumption timing  1.44  0.490  1.39  0.30 
Housing demand  0.10  0.065  0.09  0.62 
Money demand  -0.03  0.023  -0.03  -0.22 
Debt service  -0.12  0.044  -0.12  -0.28 
Overall benefit  1.39  0.473  1.34  0.30 
Note: Results are based on 10,000 stochastic simulations. 
“Pearson’s  measure of  skewness: 3*(arithmetic mean -  median)/standard deviation. 
disinflation to 1.52 percent. Besides this, the marginal rate of taxation (7’  = 
37.6 percent) has an appreciable influence. 
In addition, the calculations react quite sensitively to the assumption con- 
cerning the interest rate elasticity of savings, for which a benchmark value of 
qsr  = 0.25 was determined (see appendix B). Lowering this elasticity to 0.10 
reduces the benefit to 1.11 percent of GDP, whereas increasing it to 0.40 (i.e., 
the benchmark value used by Feldstein) increases the benefit to 1.74 per~ent.’~ 
The shadow price of taxation for calculating the indirect revenue effects was 
set by Feldstein at the benchmark value X = 0.4 and the alternative value 1. As 
explained above, this parameter is not set exogenously in our calculations but 
is instead determined model-endogenously as the shadow price of capital in- 
come taxation with the value A = 0.34. 
Deterministic parameter variations, in which all the other input values are 
kept constant, can give only an incomplete description of the uncertainties con- 
tained in a model calculation of this kind. For that reason, we have also used a 
Monte Car10 simulation to assess the variability of  the benefit of price stability. 
In doing this, we regard all 23 parameters as independently normally distrib- 
uted random variables.57  The mean values of  this distribution are the bench- 
mark values used in our calculation. The difference between the lower (or up- 
per) parameter value shown in appendix table 2D.3 and the benchmark value 
was set as the (subjective) standard deviation in all cases. As mentioned above, 
we assume that there is a roughly .68 probability of the actual parameter value 
being within the stated interval. We have taken a random sample from each of 
the 23 distributions and recalculated the benefit of price stability. This opera- 
tion was repeated 10,000 times. 
Table 2.5 shows the results of these simulation exercises. At 1.39 percent of 
GDP, the arithmetic mean of the benefit of price stability is very close to the 
56. This sensitivity to the interest rate elasticity of  savings is likewise revealed in the calcula- 
tions made by Feldstein, which show the overall benefit (0.65, 1.04, and 1.62) for alternative values 
of the interest rate elasticity (0, 0.4, and 1). 
57. The assumption of  independence  is undoubtedly  a great  simplification. An  empirically 
grounded estimation of the correlation structures between the structural parameters and the behav- 
ioral coefficients would go beyond the scope of this study, however. 77  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
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Fig. 2.2  Frequency distribution of benefits 
deterministic value  1.41. The simulated standard deviation amounts to 0.47 
percent of GDP. The median of the distribution of  the overall benefit is 1.34 
percent of GDP. This means (see also fig. 2.2) that the distribution of the bene- 
fit is positively skewed, which is likewise expressed in the positive Pearson 
measure of skewness of 0.30. 
According to the simulation calculations, the probability of an overall ben- 
efit of less than  1 percent of GDP is 0.21. By contrast, the probability of the 
benefit being greater than the breakeven point of  G = 0.28 percent of GDP 
(which was established in section 2.3) is 0.998. 
2.3.7  On the Optimal Rate of Disinflation 
We have assumed hitherto that the rate of inflation is reduced by 2 percent- 
age points. In view of the determined costs and benefits, it remains question- 
able whether this is the optimal strategy, however. This requires an additional 
test criterion. Howitt, from a welfare-economic point of view, postulates the 
following rule in order to assess which (dis)inflation rate a central bank should 
aim for (Howitt’s rule): “In order to estimate the optimal target rate of inflation, 
one must somehow balance the gains from reducing inflation against the costs 
of doing so. The reduction in inflation should continue as long as the present 
discounted value of the benefits to society from a further small reduction ex- 
ceeds the present discounted value of the cost. The optimal target rate is the 
rate at which the benefit of  further reduction just equals the cost of  raising 
unemployment by the required amount above the natural rate.”58  As the preced- 
ing comments have shown, both the benefits (G)  and the costs (C)  are regarded 
as (nonlinear) functions of the rate of disinflation (T);  see equations (1  1) and 
(51) and figure 2.3. 
As a function of the constant discounting factor p (see subsection 2.2.3), the 
net benefit (g) of disinflation may be expressed as 
58. Howitt (1990, 104). Howitt’s rule is discussed in detail by Thomton (1996). 78  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
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Fig. 2.4  "Optimal" rate of disinflation 
(52)  g(r) =  G(T) - pC(r) =  T' - p~d+'p 
In accordance with Howitt's  rule, the optimal disinflation rate (r*)  must 
fulfil the necessary condition dg/dr = 0, resulting in 
(53) 
The higher the discounting rate and the higher the sacrifice ratio, the lower 
the optimal disinflation rate. Assuming as before 5 =  cp  = 0.5, p = 2.5 percent, 
and cr = 4, the optimal disinjation rate is rr* = 3.3  percent (see fig. 2.4). The 
empirical data used in the estimate reflect the average conditions in the period 
199  1-95  when the statistically measured average inflation rate was 3.3 percent. 
Bearing this in mind, the result achieved suggests the conclusion that it would 
be optimal to aim at a zero inflation rate or stability of  the measured price 
The result obtained for the optimal inflation rate in accordance with 
equation (53) depends to a considerable extent, however, on the choice of pa- 
59. As Scarth (1990) has shown, a goal of this kind would be both transparent and credible. 79  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
rameters included in it and, for that reason, should not be overvalued. Addition- 
ally, there are uncertainties and risks both in quantifying the disinflation costs 
and (as the sensitivity analyses have shown) in quantifying the benefits, which 
suggest a cautious interpretation of the results. 
If there is anything in the world which ought to be stable it is money, the 
measure of everything which enters the channels of  trade. 
-FranFois  Le Blanc, Traite‘ historique des monnayes de France (1690; 
quoted in Einaudi 1953) 
2.4  Summary and Conclusions 
In the run-up to European monetary union and the discussion to be held on 
the monetary policy strategy of a future European Central Bank, Issing writes, 
“The current large measure of consensus is not a guarantee, however, that the 
pendulum will not  swing back at some point in the future. . .  . The risk of 
inflation is not dead simply because the statistics show price stability at pres- 
ent. It will have been really conquered only when it has disappeared once and 
for all from the range of attractive available policy options” (1996a, 309). 
In that respect, this study has confirmed for Germany what Feldstein discov- 
ered for the United States: inflation is anything but an attractive option. The 
interaction of even moderate rates of inflation with the existing system of taxa- 
tion results in a significant loss of  welfare. The change from an equilibrium 
‘‘true” inflation rate of 2 percent (which may correspond to a measured rate of 
3 percent) to a rate of  zero brings permanent welfare gains, equivalent to 1.4 
percent of GDP year for year. The deadweight loss of 2 percent inflation is so 
great because Germany has a high saving rate, capital income is taxed heavily, 
and the tax system is not indexed. Inflation intensifies the distortions of tax- 
ation on capital income. For that reason the welfare gains of  price stability 
should be measured not by  a “Harberger triangle” but by  a “Feldstein trape- 
zoid.” Even if we regard the output losses (in the form of a temporary Okun 
gap) during disinflation as far from negligible, there are, in our opinion, no 
convincing arguments that moderate inflation is superior to price stability. 
In the years 1991-95,  the base period of our calculations, the average mea- 
sured rate of inflation turned out to be 3.3 percent per annum. In 1996 the rate 
of inflation was 1.5 percent. Considering the sustained economic problems of 
the new Lander in eastern Germany and the difficult labor market situation, 
one may ask whether this policy of disinflation by about 2 percentage points 
was justified or whether the Bundesbank should have executed a more expan- 
sionary monetary policy in order to stabilize the inflation rate at 3.3 percent. 
According to our calculations, the disinflation by almost 2 percentage points 
was well justified, provided one is prepared to look not only at the short-lived 
costs of disinflation but also at the longer term gains of price stability. This is 
a powerful argument for putting monetary policy into the hands of an indepen- 80  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
Table 2.6  Menu of Choices (costs and benefits as percent of GDP) 
Initial Measured Rate of Inflation”  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3 
Rate of  Disinflation  0.0  1 .o  2.0  3.3  4.0  5.0 
Final Measured Rate of Inflation  3.3  2.3  1.3  0.0  -0.7  -1.7 
Permanent benefits  0.00  0.85  1.41  1.86  2.01  2.24 
Annualized costs  0.00  0.10  0.28  0.60  0.80  1.12 
Benefits minus costs  0.00  0.75  1.13  1.26  1.21  1.12 
Annual loss in welfare  -1.26  -0.51  -0.13  0.00  -0.05  -0.14 
”Average rate of inflation between 1991 and 1995. 
dent and forward-looking institution with a long time horizon. An independent 
central bank with the primary goal of  price stability is able to invest in the 
public good called “price stability” even if the starting costs exceed the first- 
round benefits, as is usually the case for long-lived investments. Besides this, 
it should not be forgotten that the sacrifice ratio hinges on the degree of nomi- 
nal rigidity, which can be influenced to some extent by carefully choosing the 
timing, speed, and policy mix of disinflation. The menu of choices in table 2.6 
summarizes the main results of our study. 
Stabilizing the rate of inflation at 3.3 percent would have avoided any costs 
of  disinflation, but there would have been no gains either. Compared to the 
optimal strategy, the policy of preserving the status quo achieved at that time 
would have incurred a permanent annual welfare loss of roughly 1.3 percent 
of  GDP. A modest disinflation by  1 percentage point already would have re- 
duced the unexploited gains to 0.5 percent of GDP. The actual amount of disin- 
flation by  almost 2 percentage points exploits almost all potential gains, pro- 
vided the present rate of inflation will be sustained. More disinflation (to bring 
the measured rate down to zero) would produce only small additional gains. 
On the other hand, as table 2.6 shows, overshooting the optimal rate of disin- 
flation is associated with relatively small welfare losses. However, one should 
keep in mind that there are other costs and benefits of disinflation, not investi- 
gated in this paper. A too low (i.e., negative) inflation rate may, for example, 
destabilize international financial markets and cause a range of  other adjust- 
ment problems. 
Having made these caveats, we conclude our study as follows: 
Importance:  Inflation, even at moderate rates of 2 or 3 percent per annum, 
is a very costly economic policy option. 
Asymmetry: The welfare loss of a too high inflation rate is large; the welfare 
loss of a too small inflation rate appears to be small. 
Robustness: It does not matter much whether monetary policy aims at price 
stability in terms of the measured or the “true” rate of inflation. This 
decision should be based on such criteria as transparency, clarity, and- 
above all-credibility. 81  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
Price 
C2  C1  Co  Ret.Consumption 
Fig. 2A.1  Demand for retirement consumption 
At the outset we asked whether the benefits of price stability  justify the costs 
of disinflation. To this we can now give a short, unequivocal answer: No infla- 
tion is better than low inflation! In fact, our results clearly indicate that the aim 
of price stability should receive priority. Tobin’s often-quoted comment that “it 
takes a heap of Harberger Triangles to fill an Okun Gap” (1977,467) therefore 
needs to be amended. In brief-and  to extend the metaphor-it  should con- 
tinue “but it only takes one single Feldstein Trapezoid to do it.” 
Appendix A 
The Welfare-  Theoretical Approach 
Consider the following three points (pi,  Ci)  on the compensated demand func- 
tion for retirement consumption, each corresponding to a specific type of re- 
gime (see fig. 2A.1): 
No tax, no inflation  (p,, C,) 
Tax, no inflation  (P,? C,) 
Tax and inflation  (PZ?  CZ) 
Without taxes and inflation consumer surplus is the sum of areas A through 
E60  Introducing capital income taxes in an environment of price stability moves 
the equilibrium point from (p,,  C,)  to (pi,  C,) with less retirement consump- 
60. Problems with the concept of consumer surplus as a measure of welfare effects are discussed 
in detail by  Silberberg (1978). 82  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
tion at a higher price. Consumer surplus is reduced to the area C + E + F and 
tax revenues corresponding to the area B + D are created. The difference, the 
triangle A, is a deadweight loss; it is the reduction of consumer surplus that is 
not compensated by  higher tax revenues. The deadweight loss per deutsche 
mark of taxes raised is 
A,  =  A/(B +  D). 
Introducing both taxes and inflation moves the equilibrium point to (p2,  CJ, 
with a reduced consumption level at a higher price. The remaining consumer 
surplus is the area F,  whereas tax revenues correspond to the rectangle D + E. 
The deadweight loss increases to the triangle A + B + C. The following table 
summarizes the welfare accounting for the three regimes: 
Regime  Consumer Surplus  Tax Revenues  Deadweight Loss 
No tax, no inflation  - 
Tax, no inflation  C+E+F  B+D  A 
Tax and inflation  F  D+E  A+B+C 
A + B + C + D + E + F  - 
Hence, moving from the equilibrium with taxes and inflation to price stabil- 
ity increases consumer surplus by the area C + E and changes tax revenues by 
the amount (B + D) -  (D + E) = B -  E. The welfare difference between 
the two regimes is a reduction of deadweight loss, that is, a deadweight gain, 
measured by the trapezoid B + C. 
Assuming that the government faces a strict budget constraint at the margin, 
the change in tax revenues needs to be compensated by increasing (if negative) 
or decreasing (if positive) other taxes. If the deadweight loss per deutsche mark 
of some compensating tax is denoted by h, then 
(-42)  G,  = (B +  C) +  X(B - E) 
is the net deadweight gain of price stability. 
Appendix B 
An Overlapping Generations Model 
Consider the following simple overlapping generations model with a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function: 
c  I-* 
(Bl)  max-  +  s-  cb2  .  s  = (1 +  p)-',  p >  -1,  *  > 0, 
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p  = (1 +  r)-T. 
Cy denotes consumption of  the young generation and C,  is their retirement 
consumption; S,  represents savings of the young and W is their (exogenous) 
wage income. The parameter p represents the rate' of time preference, and 1PP 
measures the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution.6L  Equation (B3) corre- 
sponds to equation (13) in the main text. The solution of this model is 
1 
P 
c;r+l  =  -Y(l - a). 
The variable 0  is the young generation's propensity to consume out of  wage 
income. Assuming that real wages grow with the rate n + g, from equation 
(B3) we can write consumption of the presently old as the sum of their previous 
period's savings and the accumulated interest income of these savings as 
-Syr,  (B7)  C,,  =  -S yr-l  = 
(Dis)saving of the presently old equals interest income minus consumption: 
whereq  = (1 +  n +  g)-'.  1 
P  P 
so, =  -(1  4  - p)S,, - Cor = -qSyt. 
P 
Total savings (in period t)  are equal to savings of the young plus savings of the 
presently old: 
(B9)  s,,  =  syr  +  so, = (1 - q)S,,. 
In the period  1985-94  the average annual growth rate of  real wages was 
n + g = 2.2 percent,62  which discounted over a generation of  T = 27 years 
yields q = 0.556, implying S,  = O.444Sy. Private saving accounted for 9.3 
percent of  GDP on average between 1991 and  1995. Hence, from equation 
(B9) we get S,  = 0.209GDP. 
61. See Blanchard andFischer (1989) and Romer (1996).  In the special case ?+1,  the instanta- 
neous utility function simplifies to the logarithmic utility function. 
62. Due to German unification and other factors, the growth rate of real wages in West Germany 
in the period 1990-94 (1.4 percent) was exceptionally low and understates the long-term equilib- 
rium growth rate. For this reason we use the average growth rate of the past 10 years. 84  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
Alternatively, equation (B5) can be used to calculate savings of the young. 
This requires estimating the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution (W). 
Applying the Euler equation approach, Flaig (1990, 1994) obtains an intertem- 
poral elasticity of  substitution (IES) in the range 0.24-0.43  from aggregate 
consumption data for Germany. These low values imply a negative interest 
rate elasticity of saving. However, estimates of the IES by the Euler equation 
approach from aggregate data are likely to be biased downward. Attanasio and 
Weber show “that the bias introduced by using aggregate consumption data to 
estimate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution can be substantial” (1995, 
569). In particular, aggregate data may imply an elasticity of substitution close 
to zero, even if it is one at the microlevel. This is confirmed in an empirical 
study by Beaudry and Wincoop (1996) for the United States based on a panel 
of state data. They find “that the IES for nondurables consumption is signifi- 
cantly different from 0, and probably close to 1  .”  Hence, Flaig’s results would 
seem to be consistent with 1”  = 4/3. Using the real interest rate calculated 
in the main text, that is, r = r, = 4.24 percent (p  = 0.326) and assuming a 
rate of  time preference of  p = 2.5 percent (s = 0.513), yields Cn = 0.626. 
Wages in West  Germany accounted for cx  = 56 percent of  GDP on average 
over  the  period  1990-94.  Hence,  from  equation  (B5)  we  obtain  S,  = 
0.209GDP, which matches the result obtained via equation (B9). 
Differentiating equation (B5) with respect to the interest rate yields the in- 
terest rate elasticity of the saving of the young: 
This elasticity is positive if the elasticity of substitution (I/*)  is greater than 
one. Using the same parameter values as before, we obtain an estimate of the 
interest rate elasticity of saving of the young of qs,  = 0.23. 
Appendix C 
An Overlapping Generations Model with Transfers 
The analysis so far has implicitly assumed that a fully funded system is in 
place for providing old-age pensions. The purpose of this appendix is to take 
into account the fact that many retirees actually receive a significant amount 
of exogenous income through an unfunded (pay as you go) system. 
We retain the utility function (B 1) of appendix B, that is, 
c  I-XJ 
(Cl)  maxA  +  s-  cz  *  s = (1 +  p)-‘,  p  >  -1,  *  > 0, 
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but change the budget constraints for the young (B2) and the old (B3) genera- 
tion to 
(C2)  c,, +  s,,  =  y(1 -  - Y) f z,, 
We  assume that the total wage income accrues to the young generation, as 
well as all government transfers, except pension payments. On the other hand, 
the old (retired) generation receives all nonwage income plus the pension pay- 
ments. Hence, in equation (C2), W represents the (exogenous) gross wage in- 
come, including employers’ contributions to social security (i.e., to the pension 
fund and to health and unemployment insurance); T is an average “tax” rate 
that comprises employees’ and employers’ contributions to the social security 
system except for contributions to the pension fund; y is the rate paid (by both 
employers and employees) to the pension fund; and Z is the amount of  net 
government transfers received  by  the young  generation. In  equation  (C3), 
yWlq is the amount of pensions received by  the old generation; and R is the 
net amount of transfers left by  the old generation. We assume that this amount 
is channeled through the government sector such that there is no direct link 
between the amount bequeathed by  the old (R)  and the amount of transfers 
received by  the young (Z).  Note that in contrast to the rate of  return (r)  of 
savings of the young, the implicit rate of return of contributions to the pay-as- 
you-go pension fund is the real growth rate n + g.63 
Solving equation (Cl) subject to the restrictions (C2) and (C3) yields the 
following optimal consumption and saving schedules: 
*1  1 
P  4 
(C6)  Cot+,  = -[y(l  -  T -  y) + Z,l(l - a)  -  -[yy -  R,I(1 - a). 
The parameter R is defined in equation (B4) of appendix B. Assuming, that 
the growth rate of real wages (W)  and transfers (Z, R) is n + g, consumption 
of the presently old (eq. [B7]) becomes 
(C7)  Cot =  -S,,  4  +  yy  - R,. 
P 
63. In a fully funded system we have p  = q and yWlp drops out of eq. (C3) when eq. (C2) is 
inserted. Hence, the optimal saving and consumption plan is independent of contributions to the 
pension fund (y)  in a fully funded system. 86  Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard Ziebarth 
Table 2C.1  Income and Expenditure of Private Sector 
Item  Young  Presently Old  Total 
Saving  S"  so  SW 
Consumption  C"  co  CW 
Total  W"  Q*  YD 
Table 2C.2  Income and Expenditure of Private Sector under 2 Percent Inflation 
(percent of GDP) 
Item  Young  Presently Old  Total  Total (1991-95) 
Saving  18.1  -10.1  8.1  9.3 
Consumption  28.8  29.3  58.1  56.4 
Total  46.9  19.2  66.2 
Total ( 199  1-95)  46.2  19.5  65.7 
The equations for savings of the presently old (B8) and total private savings 
(B9) remain valid, however: 
(C8)  so, = -@,,  7 
These relationships imply accounting table 2C. 1 for period t. 
In table. 2C.  1, W, = W(  1 -  T -  y) + 2 denotes net wage income plus 
transfer payments (but excluding pensions), which is attributed to the young 
generation; Q, is the sum of net income from capital ownership (profit plus 
interests) and pension payments, both attributed to the old generation; Y, is 
disposable income of  the private sector, which is broken down into private 
savings (SJ  and private consumption (C,). 
We use the same parameter values as in appendix B, that is, p = 2.5 percent, 
r2 = 4.24 percent, n + g = 2.2 percent (+O  = 0.626), and W = 0.56GDP, 
and additionally set 
y  =  0.15,  T =  0.28,  2  =  O.lSGDP,  R  =  0.1OGDP. 
The parameter R was calibrated such that the model approximately reproduces 
the income and expenditure account of the private sector in Germany for the 
period 1991-95  (see the last row and last column of table 2C.2). Under condi- 
tions of price stability the net real interest rate rises from r2 = 4.24 percent to 
I, = 4.87 percent (see subsection 2.3.1). A new equilibrium can be calculated, 
which is reported in table 2C.3. 
The higher real interest rate increases saving of the young only by 0.5 per- 
cent of  GDP and reduces consumption of the young accordingly (note that the 87  Price Stability versus Low Inflation in Germany 
Table 2C.3  Income and Expenditure of Private Sector under Price Stability 
(percent of GDP) 
Item  Young  Presently Old  Total 
Saving  18.6  -  10.4  8.3 
Consumption  28.3  35.8  64.1 
Total  46.9  25.4  72.4 
net income of the young is given exogenously)."  Because dissaving of the old 
rises by 0.3 percent of GDP, total private saving increases only by 0.2 percent 
of GDP. The biggest change occurs for consumption of the old: this aggregate 
increases from 29.3 to 35.8 percent of GDP. 
What are the welfare consequences of this move from 2 percent inflation to 
price stability? To recalculate the benefits of price stability along the lines of 
section 2.3, we have to recognize that equation (13) (S =  pC)  changes to equa- 
tion (C3), which is reproduced here for convenience, dropping subscripts, as 
(C3'/13') 
From this equation we derive the following expression for the price elasticity 
of saving: 
where 
qnp = (l/* - 1)(1 - 0). 
The compensated price elasticity of retirement consumption becomes 
with 
Introducing the parameter values used above produces qnp = 0.125, qsp  = 
-0.170  (qsr  = 0.186), uy  = 0.246, and cCp  = -0.987.  This, in turn, yields C, 
-  C,  = 7.82 percent of GDP as the induced change of old-age consumption. 
64. This suggests that the change of the marginal product of capital would be small, justifying 
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Using equations (15) through (19) we obtain the following areas under the 
compensated demand function: 
A = 5.21 percent of GDP 
B = 1.68 percent of GDP 
C = 0.19 percent of GDP 
D = 11.30 percent of GDP 
E = 2.58 percent of GDP 
The net benefit of price stability in this extended model incorporating intergen- 
erational transfers turns out to be 
G,  =  1.87 +  0.40*(-0.91)  =  1.50%of GDP. 
Hence, the gain from improved intertemporal allocation of consumption and 
saving is almost the same as that obtained on the basis of the simpler model in 
the body of the paper. Appendix D 
Table 2D.1  Taxation of Corporate Profit 
Distributed Profits  Retained Profits 
Rate"  of Domestically  Rate"  Rate"  of Domestically 
(%)  Incorporated Enterprise  (%)  Income of Partnership  Incorporated Enterprise 
a. Gross rate of return (%) 
b. Trading capital (DM) 
c. Gross profit (DM) 
d. Tax on trading capital (of b) 
e. Trade earnings tax (of c + d) 
f. Gross dividendtaxable income 
g. Corporation tax (off) 
i. Trade earnings tax (off + g) 
j. Solidarity surcharge (of g + i) 
k.  Corporation property tax (of b) 
1.  Income tax (off) 
m. Solidarity surcharge (of 1) 
n. Property tax (of b) 
0. Tax credit (g + i +  j) 
p. Net profit (DM) 
q. Net rate of return (%) 
r. Tax burden (DM) 
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"Effective calculated rates, relative to the respective basis for assessment. Table 2D.2  Assumptions for Calculating the Benefits 
Parameter  Germany  United States" 
Effective inflation rate (%) 
Fiscal policy parameters 
Average tax rate on distributed profits (%) 
Marginal tax rate on distributed profits (%) 
Marginal income tax rate (including solidarity 
Property tax rate (%) 
Effective tax rate on capital gains (%) 
Auerbach elasticity 
Useful fiscal economic life of fixed assets (years) 
Tax concession as percentage of acqusition costs 
Marginal excess burden of taxation 
Real gross rate of return (%) 
Discounting period (years) 
Ratio of corporate debt to capital (%) 
Ratio of equity and bonds to net wealth of private 
Depreciation and maintenance costs of housing 
Nominal mortgage rate (%) 
Ratio of mortgage to value of owner-occupied 
Value of owner-occupied housing (% of GDP) 
Debt service (% of public debt) 
Public debt (% of GDP) 
Growth rate of real wages and of GDP (%) 
Ratio of wages to GDP (%) 
Ratio of  saving to GDP (%) 
Ratio of money stock (currency in circulation and 
surcharge; %) 






minimum reserves; % of GDP) 
Behaviorak coefficients 
Interest rate elasticity of saving 
Compensated interest elasticity of investment in 
























































"From  Feldstein (1997). Table 2D.3  Sensitivity Calculations 
Parameter 
Assumptions  Resultsg 
Benchmark  A  B  AB 
Effective inflation rate (%) 
Fiscal policy parameters 
Average tax rate on distributed profits 
(%) 
Marginal tax rate on distributed 
profits (%) 
Marginal income tax rate (including 
solidarity surcharge; %) 
Useful fiscal economic life of fixed 
assets (years) 
Tax concession as percentage of 
acquisition costs of owner- 
occupied housing 
Financial parameters 
Real gross rate of return (%) 
Discounting period (years) 
Ratio of corporate debt to capital (%) 
Ratio of equity and bonds to net 
wealth of private households (%) 
Depreciation and maintenance costs 
of housing (%) 
Nominal mortgage rate (%) 
Ratio of mortgage to value of owner- 
occupied houses (%) 
Value of owner-occupied housing 
(% of GDP) 
Debt service (% of public debt) 
Public debt (% of  GDP) 
Growth rate of real wages and of 
Ratio of wages to GDP (%) 
Ratio of savings to GDP (%) 
Ratio of money stock (currency in 
Macroeconomic relations 
GDP (%) 
circulation and minimum reserves; 
% of GDP) 
Behavioral coefficients 
Interest rate elasticity of saving 
Compensated interest rate elasticity 
of  investment in housing capital 





















































































































"Figures show the net benefit in comparison to the net benefit of  1.41 percent of  GDP assuming 
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